Turkish Law Blog

Comparison of Remarkable Differences in the Sanctions System of EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law

Deniz Özgür Yılmaz Deniz Özgür Yılmaz/ Brunel University London
28 January, 2019
14966

1. Introduction

Differences between the US and in EU, concerning laws, and jurisdictions with the contribution of their backgrounds leads to follow different approaches in common issues, inevitably. Although in certain points they come together- like sharing similar aims; prevention, punishment and deterrent anticompetitive behaviour, their sanctions systems indicate significant differences. In this essay, primarily we will be looked at briefly developments and goals of the EU competition and US antitrust law, and then significant differences will be explained in sanctions system of the EU and the US in competition law. Consequently, the ideal form of sanctions and criticised points of the current systems will be evaluated.

2. Development of the US Antitrust Law and EU Competition Law

The term antitrust, which grew out of the US trustbusting policies of the late nineteenth century, developed over the twentieth century to connote a broad array of policies that affect competition. [1]Whether applied through the US, European, or other national competition laws, antitrust occurs as an important competition policy instrument, which reflects many countries’ policies toward business. As a set of instruments whose goal is to make markets operate more competitively, as competition law is based on the principle that competition itself is the best mechanism for avoiding welfare loses.

Modern competition policy started with the adoption of the Sherman Act, as it is seen one of the most significant turning points in the evolution of modern competition. With the fear of domination of monopolies the market in the late 1800s, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, and it still forms the basis of most antitrust law today.

The US Antitrust laws aim to prohibit anticompetitive behaviour and unfair business practices in the meantime they encourage competition in the marketplace. Accordingly, the Sherman Act Section 1 concentrates specific anticompetitive conduct and prohibits "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”  The Section 2 emphasises the results of deemed anticompetitive behaviour and prohibits actions: “ Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” These two sections intend to prohibit all anticompetitive behaviour in the marketplace.

Nowadays, there are three main antitrust regulation laws in the US: Sherman Act 1890, Clayton Act 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act.

The Federal Trade Commission Act is a catchall enactment which including all the prohibitions under other antitrust law. The Clayton Antitrust Act, which lists additional prohibited conducts, such as price discrimination, exclusive dealing agreements, tying agreements and it intends to strengthen enforcement of antitrust laws. The Clayton Act can impose only civil penalties, and it’s enforced by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission.

In Europe, competition law always enjoyed prominence and competition policy gained momentum after World War II with the break-up trusts that had played a role in wartime production. The Paris Treaty contained provisions regarding cartels, concentrations (mergers), and abuse of dominant position by firms.[2]

In 1957, the fourth Preamble of Treaty of Rome included the following principle:  “Recognising that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition.”  In Art 3 (1) (g) (originally Art 3 (f)), The Treaty of Rome aims to ensure a system in the market which “that competition in the market is not obstructed by anticompetitive behaviour of companies or national authorities”. Art 3 had great importance because it placed the principle of undistorted competition in the fundamental provision of the Treaty.

Furthermore, the European Commission (EC) was given the authority to enforcement of competition rules. With Regulation 1/2003, national competition authorities were given a role in the enforcement of EU Competition law.

Since 2009, Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) form the legal basis of EU competition law. Art 101 TFEU prohibits anti-competitive agreements between companies, while Art 102 prohibits the abuse of dominant market position. Moreover, Article 103 gives the European Council powers to put in place an enforcement system, which includes the imposition of fines and in the meantime, Council Regulation 1/2003, based on Article 103 TFEU, gives the European Commission powers to enforce these rules and fine companies for infringements.

3. Goals of US of the US Antitrust Law and EU Competition Law

There are profound disagreements about the goals which competition law should seek[3]. The possible goals of comp law can be aligned as follows: Economic efficiency and welfare, economic freedom and the process of competition, protecting competitors, fairness, public policy and socio-political factors, the EU dimension of the single market.

The basic objective of the antitrust laws can be considered to eliminating practices that do not correspond to free competition, as antitrust laws are designed to promote a competitive economy “in which each business has a full opportunity to compete on the basis of price, quality, and service.”

In the US, there has been an intense debate over the goals of antitrust law during the more than 120-year old history of the Sherman Act[4]. In the beginning of antitrust, much of the policy discussions aimed to combat the power of trusts while having a wish of protecting small business. Today, consumer welfare is located at the beginning of the list of goals presented by US antitrust authorities. The following sentence verifies this aim: “United States` primary commitment in the enforcement of its antitrust law is to serve the goal of the welfare of consumers”.[5]

While the current discussion in the US centres the choice of a consumer welfare standard, there is no unifying goal can be found in EU competition law as it was said “The system of European competition law has always had and still has different objectives: economic and non-economic objectives, political and social objectives, legal objectives. A unitary goal is not desirable and not realistic.”[6]  From a traditional perspective, EU Competition law constitutes the achievement of market integration. Taking into consideration all the components of EU competition law goals can be specified as followings: Consumer welfare, market integration, protection of competition, protection of small businesses and the protection of economic freedom.

4. Comparison of Remarkable Differences in the Sanctions System of EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law

The US Antitrust and EU Competition laws share common goals; both seek to enhance the interest of consumers, protect competitors’ access the market and try to protect the free flow of goods in a competitive economy. However, when taken into consideration of types of sanctions, it seems there are remarkable differences in the EU Competition and US Antitrust law.

These differences occur in relation to “range of antitrust offenders that can be fined, the type and legal form of sanctions and their magnitude”.[7]

a) Individuals Liability

The first fundamental difference arises in the form of liability of undertakings or individuals. In EU Competition law, European Commission (EC) has the power to enforce fines on only undertakings, while in the US such penalties are combined with the fines on individuals as well as imprisonment. In Case 170/83 Hydroterm v Compact[8], The Court of Justice of the European Union defined the term “undertaking” as “must be understood as designating an economic unit for the purpose of the subject-matter of the agreement in question even if the law that economic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal”.  Following this definition, the European Commission imposes fines on companies or other legal persons, while in the US sanctions can be imposed on individuals such as corporate directors, officers and employees. Therefore, as the EU does not power to impose fines or criminal penalties on individuals who participate in anticompetitive behaviour, national competition authorities and criminal law enforcers hold that power, irrespective of whether these behaviours prohibited by national or EU law.  Additionally, some EU countries have been introduced individual fines in their legislation for example; The Dutch competition authority may impose to fine individuals up to €450,000. In France, individuals can be subject to fines of up to €75,000, while in Germany maximum fine may be up to a € 1 million.

In relation to US Antitrust sanction system, in order to justify the introduction of imprisoning, it`s deterrence effect over individuals was used as the main argument. The US Department of Justice has several times emphasized that many cartels, which were almost worldwide spread, did not succeed in expanding to the US, because of the fact that executives and “white-collars” feared to be caught and be gone to jail[9].

b) Legal Forms of Sanctions

The second difference appears in relation to the legal form of sanctions. The EU has an administrative enforcement system, which allows enforcing fines (financial sanctions) on undertakings. On the contrary, the US Antitrust system considers participation in a cartel as a property crime (like theft or burglary) subject to criminal sanctions including imprisonment[10]. In other saying, in hard-core cartel violations such as price fixing, market allocation agreements, bid ridding are investigated by The United States Department of Justice and Antitrust Division. In the meantime, if an infringement decision is taken under Article 7 Regulation 1/2003, the European Commission may impose an administrative fee[11]. Therefore, fines “shall not be of a criminal law nature” under Article 23 – Fines under Regulation 1/2003. Additionally, when comparing US Antitrust law with EU Competition law, in US there can be corporate fines for companies and imprisonment and/or individuals.

Europe has seen both decriminalisation and criminalisation of its competition enforcement laws, and there is an increasing number of EU Member States have authorised criminal sanctions, even some of them replaced their administrative fines system with the criminal enforcement system such as Luxembourg, Austria (for bid rigging). For instance in Romania, criminal sanctions are defined by Law with imprisonment up to 4 years (no 21/1996 (Romanian Competition Act) but the criminal sanctions has been almost not used. Although, Germany has more peculiar situation: no criminal sanctions are imposed, excluding bid rigging and it can be punished with a criminal sanction. Eventually, between 1998 and 2008, 260 people were indicted for bid rigging and more than half of them were imprisoned[12].

Furthermore, the UK and Ireland have adopted criminal sanctions. In Ireland, the Irish Competition Act has accepted the EU legal framework on undertakings; also it provides criminal sanctions for individuals. Individuals may be sentenced to a maximum of ten years` imprisonment. In Ireland between 2005 and 2009, 33 people convicted because of violations of these provisions. However, no one did not go the jail; the Irish Courts suspended prison sentences.

In addition to all these, the UK may be seen as a primary and important example of criminalisation in competition law at the EU Member States Level. Amongst the EU Member States and the US, the UK has adopted a mixed approach between the administrative fines and criminal sanctions. Having taken into consideration of visible achievement of US criminal sanctions on cartels constitutes the reason that why the UK introduced criminal sanctions. The Enterprise Act 2002 introduced criminal sanctions, individual fines and director disqualifications. Certain hard-core violations (price fixing, market sharing, and limitation of supply or production) became as a separate crime in Section 188 of the Enterprise Act. Moreover, in Section 200 was formulated for directors’ disqualification for any infringement of the national competition law. In relation to a cartel offence; according to the original text of Section 188 of the Enterprise Act, “dishonesty” was required to determine a cartel offence. However, in the first 10 years of UK criminal cartel offence, only 3 individuals, in relation to Marine Hoses cartel, were convicted and sentenced to the prison[13]. Consequently, the deterrent effect of the cartel offence had been weaker than intended and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 removed “dishonesty” requirement.

Considering the above-mentioned countries, it can be said that there is an increasing trend of deployment of criminal enforcement in the competition law. However there is also another trend; which indicates in some jurisdictions courts are unwilling to implement criminal enforcement (to imprison offenders, such as Ireland.)

Additionally, it would appear that the accepted different sanctions were reached through a variety of different law techniques; for instance in Ireland principally criminal law, in EU civil law (administrative process) and in the UK combination of civil and criminal law.

c) The Severity of the Sanctions

Another vital difference is in relation to EU, and US comparison is the severity of sanctions. In the EU, the beginning point is for the fine “a percentage of the company’s annual sales of the product concerned by the infringement”. This annual sale is the relevant sales which are happened during the last year of the infringement. The percentage of the company`s annual sales may be up to 30 %, in that point seriousness of the infringement can be taken into consideration and the relevant factors like price fixing, abuse of dominance which demonstrates the nature of the infringement. The European Commission has the power to impose fines of up to 10% of an undertaking's turnover in the last financial year for breach of EU competition rules prohibiting cartels and restrictive agreements (under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU))[14]. National competition authorities also have similar powers under their national laws.

In the US, the criminal penalties may be imposed on a corporation goes up to $100 million. For an individual, this amount may be up to $ 1 million and along with up to 10 years prison. Under federal law (Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004), the maximum fine may be reached to twice the amount the offenders acquired from the illegal acts or twice the gross loss to the victims of the crime if any of those amounts is over $100 million.

Statics emphasise that there is an increasing trend in implementing higher fines both In US and in EU. Until the very end of the 1970s the Commission`s fines was very low by today`s standards. In 1980, Pioneer case decision was a turning point concerning the magnitude of the amount of the fine: The fine was imposed by the Commission was € 7 million, the first fine to exceed $ 10 million[15]. Following that, the Commission announced that it was aimed to consolidate the deterrent effect of fines by raising its level of magnitude. Furthermore, in 1982 in the Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission emphasised that it would continue to enforce high fines “to impose a pecuniary sanction on the undertaking for infringement and prevent a repetition of the offence, and to make the prohibition in the Treaty more effective”[16].

In the EU, leniency policy was introduced in 1996, and under this policy, the first company to report a hitherto unknown cartel could benefit from immunity, rest of participants could also receive reductions in their fines.

In the 1969 first cartel decision was adopted, and between 1969 and 2013; the EU Commission imposed fines a total over €19 billion on 820 companies.

When we examine during decades; the fines were imposed by EU in 1984 was € / ECU 41 million, in 1994 €/ECU 395 million and in 2004 € 895 million. According to the Giannacari and Landi (2014) report the following data concerning total fines imposed by European Commission: €809 million (2007), €2.2 billion (2008), € 2.6 billion (2009), € 2.8 billion (2010), €741 million (2011), €1.7 billion (2012) and 2.1 billion 2013)[17].  In 2014, European Commission fined cartel participants a total of € 953 million.

According to another study, a total amount of cartel fines has risen from around EUR 500 million in the period 1990-1994 to almost EUR 9.5 billion in the period 2005-2009[18].

Between January 2000 and March 2017, the EU adopted administrative fines to 110 cartels on infringing undertakings and 11 abuse of dominance decisions.  Two highest cartel fines per case were given are “Trucks” (2016) and “Tv and computer monitor tubes” (2012) respectively € 2,296.499.00, €2,409.588.000. Addition to these, two highest cartel fines per undertakings were given in one case, “Trucks” in 2016 to the undertakings “Daimler” and “DAF Trucks”; and the fine were  € 1 008 766 000, €752 679 000 respectively. Furthermore, the first two highest abuse of dominance fines per undertaking was “Intel” (€1 060 000 000) and “Microsoft Tying (€ 561 000 000).

Lastly, in 2018, the Commission fined Google €4.34 billion for its illegal practices.

Upon the evaluation of this information, it can be said that nowadays fines has been reached the billion Euro level, as tens of millions sound routine and hundreds of millions seem severe and significant.

In the US, between 1995 and 2018, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) imposed 144 fines, which were $ 10 million or more according to figures[19].

From 1999 to 2009, 246 individual convicted for antitrust violations and out of this total, 175 individual were sentenced[20].

Between 2000 and 2003, the DoJ imposed fines passed over $ 150 million, $ 280 million, $ 75 million and $ 107 million respectively. In 2004, the fines were in over $350 million.

On another hand, in 2005, 18 antitrust offenders were sentenced to a total of 13,157 days in prison. In addition, in the same year over $338 million in criminal fines obtained against 13 corporations and 20 individuals[21].

From 2005, total fines and criminal sanctions had reached to higher amounts; $473 million (2006), $630 million (2007), $701 million (2008), $ 1 million (2009), $ 555 million (2010), $524 million (2011). $ 1.1 million (2012), $ 1 million (2013), $ 1.3 million (2014) and $ 3.6 million (2015)[22]. Following these fines, it can be emphasised that the US concentrates obviously monetary redress and recovers damage of their citizens.

When examining prison sentences, the average jail sentence was 8 months in the 1990s. However, it increased in the time and reached 10 months in 2000. The longest sentence in 2001 was 15 months, 18 months in 2002 and 21 months in 2003. Between the 2000 and 2005, antitrust offenders were exposed over 100 years of imprisonment.

In 2012, courts imposed 45 prison terms with an average sentence of just over two years.

Also, the EU and the US have been operating leniency programmes which companies are encouraged to report o anticompetitive conduct in exchanging for getting immunity or reduced fines.

Apart from these, in one point the EC and the US (DoJ and FTC) work in cooperation on competition policy in cases, which affect both jurisdictions. There are two agreements: 1991 Cooperation Agreement and the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement. The latter agreement gives a right to one party request from another party to take action if in the other`s territory is affected by an anticompetitive behaviour.

d) Do Antitrust Fines Achieve Deterrence?

In the light of figures mentioned above, certain conclusions appear.

Primarily, as a total, US imposed lower fines to companies than EU, whereas in absolute terms the levels of fines are higher in the US than the EU. In the US, increasing the fines up to $ 100 million or twice the gain/loss obviously purposes a goal of deterrence. However, in the EU, it should discuss that whether administrative fines can be imposed on companies with the limit of 10 % of total turnover will be sufficient to achieve deterrence.

Another vital point is the individual liability in the EU, as it does not allow a prison sanction on individuals. Nevertheless, administrative fines have increased over the time both in EU and in US. According to Wils, certain points should be taken into consideration. Firstly, companies’ profits “are not usually retained and in some cases, they would count only a fraction of the fine.” Furthermore, increasing fines would lead companies to go bankruptcy, losing employees etc. Imposition of high fines may have some undesirable effects: salaries of employees may cut down; the cost of fines may pass to the consumers in the form of higher prices. Therefore, Wils holds the view that to achieve deterrence; the current 10 % limit for companies is not sufficient as well as increasing fines on companies. The deterrence can be achieved only by accepting a combination of admin fines and prison sanction for individuals (like the UK). Nowadays, is an individual liability is taken seriously in the EU member countries.

Consequently, as the prison sentences increased in US, prison sanctions are an effective deterrent and carry a strong moral message for society, but it should be used only for hard-core infringements.

5. Conclusion:

Sanctions should be part of all legal regimes, and this is true for Competition law[23]. In order to prevent severe harm, which can be caused by Competition law infringements, sanctions for such infringements must be adequately strict to ensure deterrence.  In that point, the EU and the US have been following differences approaches because of their differences in legal systems. As US, antitrust enforcement is well known for its use of, prison sanctions against individuals, from fines to imprisonment, while imprisonment is absent in the EU; it can impose only administrative fines on undertakings. Moreover, the EC has been imposing increasing administrative fines on undertakings. In that point, the effective efficiency of the EU antitrust fining system has been criticised from its exclusive focus on undertakings. Moreover, the absence of prison sanctions cannot be corrected by increasing administrative fines.

As a solution, effective deterrence requires to adopt a combination of administrative fines and criminal penalties for individuals. In this way, possible imposed sanctions on individuals make employees more hesitant to breach competition law.

In recognition of introduction fines on individuals, as long as they do not have criminal nature, there is no legal obstacle in primary EU law (Art 103 TFEU), it only requires a small modification on Regulation 1/2003 (“undertakings..) However, imprisonment and other criminal sanctions cannot be introduced at the EU level under TFEU. Nevertheless, on the national level, through a directive, the EU would require the Member States to adopt criminal penalties. As, the EU members states started legalising individual liability in their legislation, such as UK, Germany. However, imprisonment only should be used for hard-core infringements; because an attempt to use the criminal law to increase deterrence carries the risk of harming the condemnatory role of criminal law in general.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Statutes or Statutory Instruments

Sherman Act (1890)

Clayton Act 1914

Federal Trade Commission Act 1914

EU legislation and cases

Treaty of Rome 1957, the fourth preamble, Art 3

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 2007, Art 1-3

Council Regulation 1/2003, Art 7, Art 23

Case 170/83 Hydroterm v Compact [1984] ECR 2999, para 11.

The Pioneer Container KH Enterprise v Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324 

Case AT.39824 - Trucks (2016)

Case AT.39437 – TV and computer monitor tubes (2012)

Case No COMP/M.6172 - DAIMLER / ROLLSROYCE / TOGNUM / BERGEN

Case AT. 39824 – DAF

Secondary Sources

Books

A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law, 6th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2016.

Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.119

Journal Articles

Barbara E Baarsma (2011) Rewriting European Competition Law from an Economic Perspective, European Competition Journal, 7:3, 559-585, https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v7n3.559, last accessed 12 January 2019

Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Policy, International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, (2001), p 553.

Ian Forrester, A challenge for Europe`s Judges: The Review of Fines on Competition Cases, European Law Review, Issue 2,2011.

Online Journals

Beryl A. Howell, Sentencing of Antitrust Offenders: What does the data show?      https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/commissioners/selectedarticles/Howell_Review_of_Antitrust_Sentencing_Data.pdf, last accessed 15 January 2018.

Scott D Hammond, An Overview of Recent Developments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, 2005, https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/overview-recent-developments-antitrust-divisions-criminal-enforcement-program, last accessed 15 January 2019.

Command Papers and Law Commission reports

D Geradin, K Sadrak, The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Quantitative Review of the Commission Decisions between 2000 and 2017, 2017, p 28

European Parliamentary Research Service, EU and US Competition Policies, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140779/LDM_BRI(2014)140779_REV1_EN.pdf, last accessed 10 January 2019.

Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, Commission of the European Communities, 1982, para 62-66.

Websites and Blogs

Alison Jones, Rebecca Williams, Deterring Cartels: Is criminalisation the solution? Lessons from the UK, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/jones_and_williams.pdf, last accessed 13 January 2019.

EU cartels and restrictive agreements: a quick guide, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-381-3369?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1, last accessed 15 January 2019

Hammond S., Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, (2004) http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.htm, accessed 12 January 2019.

Marco Slotboom, http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2013/04/25/individual-liability-for-cartel-infringements-in-the-eu-an-increasingly-dangerous-minefield/ last accessed 12 January 2019.

https://www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more, last accessed 15 January 2019.

 

[1] Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Policy, International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, (2001), p 553.

[2] European Parliamentary Research Service, EU and US Competition Policies, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140779/LDM_BRI(2014)140779_REV1_EN.pdf, last accessed 10 January 2019.

[3] A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law (6th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2016.

[4] Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.119

[5] Former FTC Chairman R. Pitofksy, Speech held at New York, 15 October 1999.

[6] Barbara E Baarsma (2011) Rewriting European Competition Law from an Economic Perspective, European Competition Journal, 7:3, 559-585, https://doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v7n3.559, last accessed 12 January 2019

[7] Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.386

[8] Case 170/83 Hydroterm v Compact [1984] ECR 2999, para 11.

[9] Hammond S., Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, (2004) http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.htm, accessed 12 January 2019.

[10] European Parliamentary Research Service, EU and US Competition Policies, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140779/LDM_BRI(2014)140779_REV1_EN.pdf, last accessed 12 January 2019.

[11] Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.386

[12] Marco Slotboom, http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2013/04/25/individual-liability-for-cartel-infringements-in-the-eu-an-increasingly-dangerous-minefield/ last accessed 12 January 2019.

[13]Alison Jones, Rebecca Williams, Deterring Cartels: Is criminalisation the solution? Lessons from the UK, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/jones_and_williams.pdf, last accessed 13 January 2019.

[14] EU cartels and restrictive agreements: a quick guide, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-381-3369?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&comp=pluk&bhcp=1, last accessed 15 January 2019.

[15] Ian Forrester, A challenge for Europe`s Judges: The Review of Fines on Competition Cases, European Law Review, Issue 2,2011.

[16] Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, Commission of the European Communities, 1982, para 62-66.

[17] Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.389

[18] D Geradin, K Sadrak, The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Quantitative Review of the Commission

Decisions between 2000 and 2017, 2017, p 28

[19] https://www.justice.gov/atr/sherman-act-violations-yielding-corporate-fine-10-million-or-more, last accessed 15 January 2019.

[20] Beryl A. Howell, Sentencing of Antitrust Offenders: What does the data show?      https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/commissioners/selectedarticles/Howell_Review_of_Antitrust_Sentencing_Data.pdf, last accessed 15 January 2018.

[21] Scott D Hammond, An Overview Of Recent Developments In The Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, 2005, https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/overview-recent-developments-antitrust-divisions-criminal-enforcement-program, last accessed 15 January 2019.

[22] Roger Van Der Bergh, Comparative Competition Law and Economics, EE Elgar, 2017, p.389

[23]  Damien Geradin, The EU Competition Law Fining System: A Reassessment, UCL Conference -- New Challenges in EU Competition Law and Enforcement, 2013

Leave a comment

Please login or register to comment

Comments