Competition Quarterly - Second Quarter of 2024

Turkish Competition Authority Approves Migros Acquisitions in Bilecik

The Turkish Competition Authority ("TCA") approved an application by Migros[1] , one of the largest supermarket chains in Türkiye, to acquire the control over four stores owned by Erfa AVM[2], a local market chain in Bilecik, in Bilecik province through the transfer of fixed assets and leasehold rights, as well as one store through the transfer of fixed assets and the establishment of a new lease agreement.

The Competition Board (“Board”) treated Migros’s acquisitions over the past three years in the same relevant product market as one single transaction in its turnover calculation, allowing the company to exceed the required turnover thresholds. The current transaction was subsequently approved, despite Erfa’s turnover being below the thresholds stipulated in the Communiqué No. 2010/4 on Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Approval of the Competition Board (“Communiqué No. 2010/4”). Of note in the legal assessment, referred to as the "8(5) rule" within Turkish competition law practise, this exceptional rule was introduced to keep control over anti-competitive concentrations in a specific market. This rule applies to transactions between the same parties or within the same relevant product market that have been recently consummated and do not individually exceed the notification thresholds, thus not requiring the Board's approval. Given its relatively exceptional nature and its creation of a broader oversight scope compared to the corresponding EU regime, this decision is considered significant for reminding the 8(5) rule.In terms of the merits, the Board applied its usual approach in defining the relevant geographic market during its assessment, considering both the size of the store involved in the transaction and the driving distance between competing stores. This method is commonly used in the European Union and is frequently applied in its decisions regarding fast-moving consumer goods (“FMCG”) retailers. Ultimately, the Board concluded that the transaction would not create competitive concerns and granted approval for the acquisition.

Competition Board Finds No Evidence of Violations by Jet Fuel Suppliers

The Board concluded its formal investigation into Petrofis[3], THY Opet[4], and Triple Star.[5]  and found no evidence of competition law violations.

Based on a 2018 complaint, the Board conducted a preliminary investigation into Petrofis, THY Opet, and Triple Star but decided not to initiate a formal investigation (“Preliminary Investigation Decision”). However, the Ankara Regional Administrative Court annulled the Preliminary Investigation Decision citing inadequate examination, thus forcing the Board to launch a comprehensive investigation.

That investigation primarily addressed the following allegations:

— Petrofis holds a dominant position in the jet fuel supply market,

— Petrofis abused this dominant position by discriminating among intermediaries in jet fuel sales by offering discriminatory prices to players engaged in jet fuel sales,

— Petrofis, THY Opet, and Triple Star engaged in an anti-competitive agreement aimed at excluding competitors, especially the Complainant, from the jet fuel sales intermediation market.

As the impacts of applying different prices to different undertakings and the concrete allegations of the Complainant regarding were not adequately investigated in the initial process, the Regional Administrative Court canceled the Preliminary Investigation Decision. Following a detailed assessment, the Board concluded:

— Consistent with the European Union's recent approach, each airport was defined as a separate geographic market, and Petrofis was found to hold a dominant position in 13 out of 18 airports subject to the investigation,

— The Complainant and Triple Star were not in equivalent positions due to significant differences in their purchase volumes, therefore, the sole fact that Petrofis offers different prices to these two undertakings does not amount to a discrimination by Petrofis,

— While the alleged discriminatory behavior could constitute a refusal to supply violation, the specific conditions for abuse such as elimination of competition in submarket and probable consumer harm were not present in this case,

— The alleged coordinated actions and/or agreements among Petrofis, Triple Star, and THY Opet were found not to stem from an express or implied agreement but to stem from the unique economic market structure,

— Therefore, Petrofis, Triple Star, and THY Opet were not engaged in anti-competitive coordinated actions/agreements.

Mavili Elektronik Fined, Authorized Service Providers Cleared

The Board concluded its investigation into Mavili Elektronik[6] and its authorized service providers on April 13, 2023, ending a four-year investigation into allegations of competition-related violations.

Kare[7] filed a complaint with the Board in 2020, alleging that Mavili Elektronik abused its dominant market position by directing Kare to its authorized service provider, Filiz[8] and interfering in pricing based on buyers.

The Board initially determined that no violation had taken place, however, the Ankara Regional Administrative Court issued an annulment regarding that decision, requiring the Board to reopen its investigation into Mavili Elektronik on allegations of resale price maintenance, customer and regional restrictions, and customer allocation.

During the investigation, the Board found that Mavili Elektronik:

— Sent price lists to its authorized service providers,

— Issued instructions regarding discount rates,

— Required approval for quotes to be provided by authorized service providers,

— Imposed sanctions on authorized service providers that did not comply with the instructions,

— Revised contracts to include penalties for authorized service providers that deviated from the instructions and pricing policy.

Furthermore, the Board initiated a separate investigation into Filiz and Yıldız[9] concerning allegations of customer allocation. It determined the undertakings did not engage in a customer-allocation agreement; instead, Mavili Elektronik allocated customers to them.

The investigation into Mavili Elektronik was resolved in a settlement, and the Board decided that no penalties would be imposed on Filiz and Yıldız.

Two Board members concurred with the decision regarding Mavili Elektronik but expressed dissenting opinions on the exclusion of its export figures from the turnover calculation based on the absence of a provision in the secondary legislation on the exclusion of foreign sales in calculating the fine amount. According to them, this approach would yield incorrect results by subtracting a gross value from a net value, therefore inaccurately reflecting the undertaking's economic power. In contrast, the Board has sometimes excluded revenues from export sales in penalty calculations, arguing they do not constitute turnover generated in Türkiye. Dissenting opinions highlight the need for a consistent approach to whether export revenues should be included in the turnover basis for administrative fines.

Exemption Granted to the Artı +1 Project

The Board evaluated SEM[10], a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sabancı Holding, regarding its request for exemption for the +1 Project (“Project”) and the +1 Analysis and Consultancy Services Framework Agreement to be signed with potential customers.

What is the +1 Project?

The Project aims to analyze consumer behavior using advanced data analytics and provide insights for marketing activities. Undertakings interested in participating in the Project submit their requests to SEM, then negotiate and sign a framework agreement. Under the Project, interested non-competing participants are informed about the theme which is determined based on demand and discuss datasets. Data is then collected from customers (with their consent) and from publicly-available sources. At the end of the Project, customized commercial or promotional insights are prepared and shared exclusively with each undertaking, after which the data is destroyed. Undertakings then use these insights to enhance their marketing activities.

Board’s Assessments

The Board has examined the potential competition law risks of the Project based on data analytics under three main headings: (i) exclusivity, (ii) exchange of competitively sensitive information among competitors, and (iii) effects that enhance coordination among competitors.

The Board determined there are no competitive concerns regarding exclusivity, on the grounds that:

— Participants are not obliged to comply with SEM’s insights,

— There is no element preventing undertakings from making decisions based on insights,

— Participants are not required to exclusively obtain SEM’s services,

— Parties may contract with third parties.

Regarding exchange of competitively sensitive information, the Board stated that backward-looking, anonymized, encrypted, and non-continuous data would not restrict competition. However, due to the potential for undertakings in digital markets to become competitors quickly, and lingering concerns about information exchange between competitors, the Board acknowledged coordination risks. SEM also indicated it had taken measures to prevent competitors from participating in the same application. Even if two competitors requested the same product, data differences would prevent problem from arising.

Despite all potential concerns related to coordination risk and information exchange between competitors , the Board considered: (i) the Project would reduce marketing and advertising costs, benefiting consumers; (ii) consumers would find the desired product more easily; (iii) efficiency would increase; (iv) high sales made with low marketing budgets would also benefit consumers.

The Board granted individual exemption to the Project for five years, requiring an independent  auditor to monitor the presence of competitor undertakings in applications, data collection, and relationships between applications to alleviate concerns.

Competition Board Accepts OBİLET’s Commitments

OBİLET[11] has submitted a final commitment statement to the Board to address concerns arising from applications that could lead to the exclusion of competitors in the ticketing software for the bus transportation (IMS), the distribution of bus service data to the platforms (B2B), and the sale of bus tickets through the platforms (B2C) . The commitment covers exclusionary actions against its competitors and online advertising and communication restrictions stipulated in agreements with competitors in the B2C market.

OBİLET instituted a policy where it stopped ticket sales on its platform for bus companies using Mydata Bilişim Ltd. Şti.’s (“MYDATA”) IMS, then resumed sales with higher commission rates. This was designed to encourage firms utilizing MYDATA's IMS to transition to OBİLET's software. The Board found that this practice effectively linked OBİLET’s IMS and B2C services. According to its commitment statement, OBİLET drafted and executed a standard agreement exclusively for the use of B2C services by bus companies utilizing IMS other than OBİLET/BİLETALL's[12] IMS or switching to them subsequently. Additionally, separate standard agreements were regulated for both B2C and IMS services with varying pricing. This addressed the Board's concern that distinct pricing mitigated the perception of IMS services being provided at no cost. OBİLET clarified that the clauses in the standard agreement concerning the end of sales via OBİLET's platform for bus companies would be evaluated independently of IMS usage.

In the Board's evaluation, it was noted that OBILET's imposition of an advertising ban on B2Cs using platforms such as Google Adwords could significantly restrict the online advertising channels of the companies concerned. Consequently, one of the commitments includes the removal of clauses from the contracts between OBILET and B2Cs that would result in such an advertising ban.

OBİLET amended the contract provisions regarding communication restriction and exclusive purchasing.

OBİLET committed to notifying relevant companies within the scope of these commitments.

The Board decided that OBİLET’s commitments presented within the file sufficiently address competitive issues considered in the scope. The Board also decided that the commitments presented in the final commitment statement should also be applied to BİLETALL under OBİLET's authority.

Koyuncu Elektronik Issued Fine for Evidence Tampering

The Board conducted an on-site inspection on September 6, 2023, after which competition experts informed Koyuncu Elektronik[13] that no correspondence or documents should be deleted from the company’s computers, email accounts, or other data storage devices until the examination was completed.

Despite the notice, experts discovered that Koyuncu Elektronik's some employees had deleted some emails from their email accounts using the soft-delete method after the start of the on-site inspection. The correspondences were recovered subsequently using the “Recover Deleted Items From Server” method, allowing all of the deleted data to be examined by competition experts.

Koyuncu Elektronik officials claimed that the deleted emails were removed due to storage space issues or for email overload. They said the deleted emails generally consisted of promotional mail, shipment and training notifications, and business development notes. However, officials could not substantiate their claim that the deletion was a routine procedure.

Based on the Board's established jurisprudence, the disruption of any data (emails, WhatsApp correspondence, etc.) by an enterprise during on-site inspections, regardless of content, is considered tampering with evidence and is deemed to hinder the on-site inspection.

The Board subsequently imposed an administrative fine on Koyuncu Elektronik.

Board Revises Interim Measure Imposed on Maçkolik

Maçkolik[14] and Nesine[15] have been investigated due to agreements between the two companies containing exclusivity clauses.

As detailed in our September 2023 issue, the investigation into Nesine resulted in the Board issuing interim measures against Maçkolik to prevent damages ahead of a final decision. The Board's interim measures eliminated the distinction between Maçkolik’s old and new websites, ordering the company to operate with a single website.

Within the scope of Article 11 of Administrative Jurisdiction Procedure Law No. 2577 (“Law No. 2577”), Maçkolik submitted an application requesting the Board reconsider its decision. It stated that that any distinction between the old and new websites was purely aimed at end-users, emphasizing that the practice was implemented to avoid losing users who were dissatisfied with the design of the new website. Additionally, Maçkolik said it had taken measures on both sites to prevent actual exclusivity in advertising spaces, implementing a rotation system to ensure equal visibility and eliminate discrimination among its collaboration partners, virtual betting sites.

Maçkolik also argued in its application that the Board's decision represented a structural measure, rather than a temporary one, and that structural measures could not be imposed through temporary means.

The Board's evaluation found that Maçkolik’s efforts to prevent actual exclusivity and provide equal conditions to its collaboration partners without discrimination was adequate. The Board also concluded that having two different sites simultaneously would not result in damages ahead of a final decision and so the temporary measure was revised to allow Maçkolik to continue operating through two sites. As the applications submitted to the Board under Article 11 of the Law on Administrative Procedure are evaluated by the Board, the outcome of the first decision is usually remains unchanged. Hence, the decision rendered regarding Maçkolik exceptionally resulted in a favorable outcome.

Two Board members issued dissenting opinions, highlighting that Maçkolik’s role as a “gatekeeper” was not taken into consideration and noting that the new website might not be as user-friendly compared to the old site. They expressed concerns that Maçkolik may not take steps to improve its new site and that the effectiveness and traceability of the temporary measure could diminish as a result.

Final Examination Decisions for Two Acquisitions

The Board announced in April that it had initiated final examination processes, which is a rare practice, for two acquisitions, effectively suspending the deals until a final decision is issued.

The first transaction is an acquisition by Param Holding International Coöperatief U.A of Kartek Holding A.Ş. In 2024, approval of the Board was requested for two more acquisitions[16] in payment services sector, however, the Board has not decided on those cases.yet. The second transaction became subject to the final examination is the acquisition of Metser, a company in the iron and steel sector based in Germany, by Opta.

While it is relatively rare for merger/acquisition transactions to be subject to final examination by the Board[17], such cases indicate the need for a more in-depth examination regarding whether the transaction would create or strengthen a dominant market position, or significantly reduce effective competition. Particularly since the legal amendment in 2020, which introduced the prohibition criterion of "significant impediment to effective competition" in Turkish competition law practice, mirroring EU law, there has been an observed increase in the number of cases undergoing final review, especially concerning concentrations. Between 2014 and 2023, out of 1965 merger applications, final examination were conducted only for 23 of them and after the legislative change in 2020, 9 out of 991 transactions were taken into final review between 2020 and 2023.

Ultimately, enterprises do have an opportunity to submit commitments regarding the transaction during this phase.

Board Intervenes in Online Hub and Spoke Cartel

On April 13, 2023, the Board initiated an investigation against undertakings operating in cosmetics and personal care products,  Evdeeczane[18], Cosmed[19], Farmakozmetika[20] and Bakım Kutusu[21], with allegation of being party to a hub-and-spoke cartel and also with the allegations of resale price maintenance and internet sales restriction against Cosmed.

Buybox, which is the name given to the box containing expressions such as “Buy Now” and “Add to Cart” on online sales platforms, refers to the system that determines which seller’s product will be redirected when clicked.

With its Buybox system, Cosmed determine the products to be included in the system and the undertakings in the system can win Buybox by offering the products on the list at lower prices. The Board assessed that with the help of Buybox system;

— Bakım Kutusu, Evdeeczane and Farmakozmetika obtain competitively sensitive information about each other

— they intervene in each other’s prices through Cosmed.

— they are able to understand that a competitor undertaking has requested such intervention as they act in the same way.

— Cosmed continuously monitors the Buybox system and intervenes in prices in case of deviation.

In light of these findings, the Board conclude that a hub-and-spoke cartel has been formed, with Cosmed being the “hub” and the other undertakings on the retailer level being “spokes”, achieving horizontal coordination.

The Board also assessed that the provision in Cosmed’s agreements with retailers, which seeks for Cosmed’s approval for retailers to sell on online marketplaces and allows that the products can only be sold to end-users, constitutes internet sales and customer restriction.

Upon the undertakings' settlement requests, the investigations were ended in relation to the violations of forming a hub-and-spoke cartel and Cosmed’s resale price maintenance, whereas the Board ended the investigation with a commitment regarding Cosmed’s internet sales restriction to its retailers.

Discussions on Export Revenue in Administrative Fine Calculations

The Board initiated an investigation into Balparmak[22] on March 9, 2023 based on allegations of resale price maintenance and following similar investigations into other FMCG businesses.

During its investigation, the Board determined that Balparmak intervened in retailers' resale prices, setting minimum and maximum resale prices, ensuring retailers adjust their prices, coordinating price increases among retailers. Balparmak used different tactics to maintain prices, such as rejecting retailers' requests for discounts/promotions and withdrawing product supply. The Board also determined that such actions took place from 2017 until the investigation was initiated.

The Board determined that Balparmak had committed a competition violation and the case ended in a settlement on June 15, 2023. Two Board members provided dissenting opinions regarding the exclusion of export figures in the decision. Other members, however, highlighted that legislation, judicial decisions, and the Board's precedents did not include such figures and that such an approach was contrary "based on the power of the undertaking in the market.”

Uludağ Investigation Ends in Settlement; Export Figures not Considered in Fine Calculation

The Board launched an investigation into Uludağ[23] on May 5, 2023 based on allegations of resale price maintenance.

The investigation revealed that Uludağ had monitored the retailers' sale prices, warning those selling below the desired price and ensuring that prices were raised to the communicated level. The Board also determined that Uludağ mandated discount rates and did not make deliveries to undertakings unless they adjusted their prices.

Retailers were complicit in the scheme, complaining to Uludağ about other retailers charging low prices and seeking Uludağ’s approval to set prices. The Board concluded that Uludağ violated competition rules by maintaining resale prices and ended the investigation with a settlement.

Two Board members argued that Uludağ’s export figures should have been included in the fine imposed on Uludağ. The members reiterated the reasons provided in the Mavili Elektronik decision in this edition of Competition & Trade Quarterly, stating there was nothing contrary in the legislation, judicial decisions and the Board's precedents suggesting otherwise and that export turnover should be included in the Uludağ’s turnover, and therefore, in the calculation of the administrative fine.

Hot Topic in Digital Markets: Daily Administrative Fines - Part 1 - Google Decision

The Board imposed a TRY 482 million fine against Google in May 2024 for failing to adequately address competition violations relating to search results that appeared on its pages.

The Board determined in April 2021 that Google, a market leader in the general search services market, created entry barriers for potential competitors and activity barriers for current competitors by prioritizing its own position and display on its results page in terms of local search (Local Unit) and accommodation price comparison (Google Hotel Ads) services.[24] Further, the Board introduced certain measures for Google to take.

Google, in light of the measures introduced, presented new proposed measures to the Board aimed at eliminating disadvantageous conditions for competitors and ensuring effective competition in the local search services market. On March, 2024, the Board accepted Google's proposed measures. Following the implementation of these measures by Google on April, 2024, the Board determined that the measures were applied only to local search services and not to measures related to comparing accommodation prices. Consequently, starting from April 15, 2024, daily administrative fines were imposed on Google.

As of May 21, 2024, Google introduced measures to eliminate the competition violation affecting accommodation queries and the Board terminated the daily fines, which had reached TRY 482 million.

Hot Topic in Digital Markets: Daily Administrative Fines - Part 2 - Meta Decision

The Board announced on May 6 and May 8, 2024 that the daily administrative fines imposed on Meta[25] in two different cases were terminated.

The Board initiated an investigation into an allegation that Meta connected the Instagram and Threads applications and transferred the data of users between the two applications without the users’ consent, thereby abusing its dominant position and    Board issued a temporary injunction to prevent irreparable damage. The Board imposed a daily administrative fine on Meta that would continue until Meta submitted a proposed measure to address the concerns. Following this decision, Meta submitted proposals it offered users in the European Union such as “use without a profile”. However, the Board did not accept Meta’s proposals because they did not address the Board’s concerns. The Board underlined that even with these measures in effect, data sharing will persist for existing Threads users, that it is compulsory to be an Instagram user for using Threads, and that use without a profile offers a low-quality experience, thus leading to a use with a profile. Meta then terminated the Threads application's operations in Türkiye on April 29, 2024 rather than applying temporary injunction upon the Board’s request. The Board terminated the daily administrative fine applied until as of the said date and imposed a fine covering the intervening period because the temporary injunction had become irrelevant.

The other daily fine imposed on Meta within the scope of an investigation into whether  Meta abused its dominant position by combining the data it collected through Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, by creating an entry barrier in the social networking services and online display advertising markets and making it difficult for competitors to operate. On October 22, 2022, the Board concluded the investigation, imposed certain obligations on Meta designed to create effective competition and terminate the infringement, and granted Meta until December 11, 2023 to take measures to resolve the Board’s concerns regarding data combination. Meta submitted its proposals to the Board related to the imposition of temporary injunction, but the Board did not consider them sufficient and imposed a daily administrative fine on Meta until such time as it submitted proposals to address the Board’s competition concerns. On April 5, 2024, Meta submitted proposals to the Board, stating that the data between applications could only be combined if users merged their accounts through the “Accounts Center”, and that consent for the data combination would be sought from former users in June. The Board found the revised measures sufficient and announced that the daily administrative fine ended, but  imposed a fine for the period between December 12, 2023 and April 4, 2024.

French High Schools Investigation Finalized

The Board concluded its investigation into the French private education institutions Istanbul Saint-Joseph French High School, Istanbul Saint Benoît French High School, Istanbul Notre-Dame de Sion French High School, Istanbul Saint-Michel French High School, and Istanbul Sainte Pulchérie French High School for allegedly acting in collaboration to fix school registration fees, the components of the school fees, and the salaries of Turkish teachers.

The investigation established that the French private education institutions had jointly determined the school registration fees and the elements constituting the school fees, and were not entitled to benefit from the individual exemption. For this reason the Board issue administrative fines to each institution separately. 

The Board also determined that the institutions agreed on the salaries of Turkish teachers and for this reason could not  benefit from the individual exemption for this behavior either. Due to this violation, the Board again imposed administrative fines on the institutions separately. With this decision, which sets an example for competition law practices in the labor market, it is once again demonstrated that violation decisions regarding the labor market may be issued in investigations initiated on different allegations.

An Investigation Initiated Against Apple During the Sector Inquiry into Mobile Ecosystems

The TCA has been conducting a Mobile Ecosystems Sector Review to determine the structure of the mobile smart devices and software sector for these devices and competition issues in the sector. As part of this study, the TCA suspected that Apple[26] was acting in a restrictive manner with regard to payment systems for application developers in the App Store.

The Board suspected that Apple restricted app developers from informing users about alternative payment channels within the app and decided it should examine whether consumers’ access to better price options was being restricted.

Apple also imposed another restriction on app developers by requiring they use its payment system, In-App Purchase (“IAP”), for in-app purchases and charged a 30% commission on sales made through IAP. The Board determined it was necessary to examine whether these restrictions limited the freedom of application developers and whether the IAP payment system prevented competitors from entering the ecosystem.

The Board subsequently initiated an investigation into Apple for prohibiting the use of payment systems other than IAP in the App Store and subjecting mobile application developers to anti-steering provisions.

Board’s Approach Regarding Territorial Restrictions Imposed on Dealers

As part of its preliminary investigation into the tractor production and marketing sector, the Board initiated an investigation on January 5, 2023, into KUBOTA[27] and TÜMOSAN[28], concerning restrictions on passive and/or active sales by dealers.

During the investigation, the Board determined that TÜMOSAN’s dealership agreements allocated specific territories to dealers, restricting active sales conducted outside these exclusive territories. Additionally, it noted that dealers were prohibited from offering price quotes to customers outside their exclusive territories and were required to direct them to dealers located in their respective areas. Furthermore, the Board reported that TÜMOSAN cancelled premiums for dealers who made sales outside their designated territories without finalizing the assessment of active – passive sales, thereby limiting both active and passive sales.

TÜMOSAN stated in its commitment text that in the Framework Dealership Agreement, dealers are restricted from making active sales outside their exclusive territories but were allowed to make passive sales. TÜMOSAN also agreed that it would only cancel the premiums earned by the dealers for sales if active sales were made outside the designated exclusive territory, but that this practice would not be applied to passive sales.  Finally, TÜMOSAN stated it would not prohibit passive sales outside dealers’ exclusive territories in an announcement addressed to the dealers. The Board considered the TÜMOSAN Framework Dealership Agreement to be appropriate and sufficient because it distinguished between active and passive sales, prohibited only active sales in the exclusive territories allocated to dealers, and explicitly stated that the restriction did not cover passive sales.

The Board found the commitment in the Framework Dealership Agreement to be adequate because the clause stating that the premiums awarded to the dealers would be cancelled only if dealers made active sales to customers outside the exclusive territory was clear and comprehensible. Furthermore, the Board found the announcement TÜMOSAN would send to dealers stating that passive sales to customers outside their exclusive territory that were made without any active effort by the dealers would not constitute any infringement was sufficient to address any concerns about anti-competitive behavior.

However, during the investigation, correspondence was uncovered indicating that KUBOTA cautioned dealers that made offers to customers outside their territories that they would only be accepted with the consent of the dealer within the customer’s region. The Board found that the premiums and retail support offered by KUBOTA to dealers were only valid for in-territory sales. Unlike TÜMOSAN, KUBOTA's dealership agreements do not grant exclusivity in terms of territory. Accordingly, the commitment text submitted by KUBOTA stated that the dealership agreements would not include restrictions on active or passive sales.

Moreover, KUBOTA committed to sharing a notice clarifying that no active or passive sales restriction existed in the dealership agreements, that it would not apply such a restriction in practice, and that it pledged to provide forms signed by dealers that confirmed they understood the announcement. The Board concluded that KUBOTA’s actions, which could potentially prevent competition due to restrictions on active and passive sales, would be mitigated by its commitments.

[1] Migros Ticaret A.Ş.

[2] Elbin Gıda İnşaat Tekstil Hayvancılık Sanayi ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi

[3] Petrofis Akaryakıt Dağıtım Hizmetleri A.Ş.

[4] THY Opet Havacılık Yakıtları A.Ş.

[5] Triple Star Aviation Ltd.

[6] Mavili Elektronik Tic. ve San. A.Ş.

[7] Kare Yangın Otomasyon Sis. San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.

[8] Filiz Güvenlik Sistemleri Proje ve Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş.

[9] Yıldız Yangın Söndürme Sistemleri San. Tic. AŞ

[10] SEM İnternet Reklam Hizmetleri ve Danışmanlık AŞ

[11] Obilet Bilişim Sistemleri AŞ

[12] OBİLET took over BİLETALL and these two companies operated as a single undertaking in the market. Therefore, the investigation continued by recognizing OBİLET and BİLETALL as a single undertaking.

[13] Koyuncu Elektronik Bilgi İşlem Sistemleri Sanayi ve Dış Ticaret AŞ

[14] Maçkolik İnternet Hizmetleri Ticaret AŞ

[15] D Elektronik Şans Oyunları ve Yayıncılık AŞ

[16] The acquisition of Paynet Ödeme Hizmetleri AŞ by iyzi Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri AŞ and the acquisition of Sofra Kurumsal ve Ödüllendirme Hizmetleri A.Ş. by Turkcell Ödeme ve Elektronik Para Hizmetleri A.Ş.

[17] Between 2014 and 2023, out of 1965 merger applications, final examination were conducted only for 23 of them.

[18] Ayaz ve Ortakları Ltd. Şti

[19] Ege Teknoloji Kimya Mak. San. Tic. Ltd. Şti

[20] Farmakozmetika Sağlık Ürünleri ve Kozmetik Tic. Ltd. Şti

[21] SB Grup Kozmetik AŞ

[22] Altıparmak Gıda San. ve Tic. A.Ş

[23] Erbak Uludağ Pazarlama Satış ve Dağıtım AŞ

[24] Refers to the economic integrity consisting of Google Reklamcılık ve Pazarlama Ltd. Şti., Google International LLC, Google LLC, Google Ireland Limited and Alphabet Inc. as stated in the Board decision dated April 8, 2021 and numbered 21-20/248-105.

[25] Meta Platforms, Inc.

[26] Apple Inc. ve Apple Teknoloji ve Satış Limited Şirketi

[27] Kubota Turkey Makine Tic. Ltd. Şti.

[28] Tümosan Motor ve Traktör Sanayi A.Ş.