Current Issues in Direct Investments From Türkiye to Mali and Sudan and the Legal Protections Provided to These Investments

1      A SUMMARY OF TÜRKİYE'S DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA

1.             Türkiye's foreign policy, driven by principles of multilateral diplomacy, has significantly increased its direct investments in African countries in recent years. With growing capital inflows, Türkiye is expanding into new markets, discovering potential opportunities, and deepening its engagement with African nations through local partnerships across the continent.

2.             OECD defines direct capital investments as cross-border investments undertaken by an investor resident in one economy with the aim of establishing a lasting relationship with an enterprise resident in another economy.[1]

3.             According to the Ministry of Trade’s "Overseas Investment Report" Türkiye has primarily invested in industries such as iron and steel, manufacturing of metals, real estate, textiles, hospitality, and food services in countries like Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia (collectively, the “North African Countries”). Additionally, industries such as transportation and storage, wholesale and retail, construction, manufacturing of electronics and optics, rubber and plastic products have seen significant Turkish investments in other African countries. The Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK[2] Overseas Investment Index 2019 highlights that 64% of Turkish investments in the continent are allocated in textiles, 27% in tourism, 5% in energy, and 3% in real estate and construction industries. These figures illustrate Türkiye’s strategic diversification across industries, bolstering its economic ties with the continent.

4.             Türkiye's investments in these sectors have gained substantial momentum over time, reflecting their strategic importance. An in-depth analysis of Türkiye’s trade strategies with Africa and the development of bilateral economic relations is necessary to fully comprehend this growth trajectory.

5.             Türkiye’s efforts to strengthen its foreign policy towards Africa began in 1998 with the adoption of the “Africa Initiative Action Plan.” This marked a significant step toward enhancing political, economic, and cultural relations with the continent. In 2005, Türkiye declared the "Year of Africa" and opened the first office of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) in Ethiopia. Subsequently, Türkiye gained observer status in the African Union, and by 2008, it joined the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund. That same year, the "Istanbul Declaration on Türkiye-Africa Cooperation: Cooperation and Solidarity for a Common Future" was adopted, granting Türkiye “strategic partnership” status with the African Union. These diplomatic initiatives laid the groundwork for a robust trade relationship, which was further strengthened with the adoption of the "Türkiye-Africa Cooperation Joint Implementation Plan" in 2010 and subsequent summits. Over the years, Türkiye's engagement with Africa has deepened, guided by principles of sustainable development and integration.

6.             Türkiye has formalized its economic relations with African countries through a variety of bilateral agreements. These include "Trade and Economic Cooperation (TECs) Agreements" with 47 countries, "Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (BITs) Agreements" with 30 countries, "Double Taxation Avoidance (DTAs) Agreements" with 8 countries, and "Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)" with 5 countries.[3]

7.             Türkiye's investments have also contributed significantly to employment in Africa. In 2014 alone, Turkish investments created 16,593 jobs, making Turkish enterprises one of the largest employers in the region. The generation of jobs is part of Türkiye’s development based broader investment strategy, which -for instance- also includes the establishment of hospitals in African countries in need of healthcare infrastructure. These hospitals are initially operated by Turkish-African joint ventures and later transferred to local authorities.

8.             The Ministry of Trade’s 2024 "Overseas Investment Report" provides a detailed analysis of Türkiye's investments across North Africa and other parts of the continent. According to the report, North African countries account for 3.74% of Türkiye’s total foreign direct investments, amounting approximately to USD 2.16 billion. In contrast, investments in other parts of the continent account for 0.17% of the total, or approximately USD 97.1 million.

9.             According to the DEİK Business Councils' Periodic Studies (2017-2019), Türkiye’s trade volume with Africa increased six-fold over 15 years, reaching USD 17.5 billion. The DEİK Overseas Investment Index 2021 further highlights that Turkish investments on the continent, which stood at USD 22 million in 2004, had risen to USD 784 million by 2018.

1.1    Investments in Mali

10.          Türkiye aims to strengthen its commercial, economic, and political relations with the African continent through strategic investments in Mali. These investments are primarily concentrated in the energy, agriculture, and tourism industries. Notably, Aksa Energy's investment in Mali contributes 60 megawatts of power generation, supplying a significant portion of the country’s energy demands.

11.          In recent years, trade between Türkiye and Mali has expanded rapidly. According to DEİK's Mali Fact Sheet, Türkiye's exports to Mali increased by 25% in 2021 compared to the previous year, while imports from Mali surged by 1300%. The major drivers of Turkish exports to Mali include electrical appliances, machinery, and furniture. On the other hand, 96% of Türkiye's imports from Mali consist of cotton, metal ores, and gold.[4]

12.          As of 2023, Türkiye’s trade relationship with Mali has continued to flourish. According to the Mali Country Profile provided by the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Türkiye, Turkish exports amounted to USD 111 million, while imports from Mali reached USD 17 million, resulting in a trade surplus in Türkiye's favor.[5]

1.2        Investments in Sudan

13.          Economic cooperation between Türkiye and Sudan has also intensified, particularly in the construction, mining, and agricultural sectors, contributing significantly to Sudan's economic development. According to DEIK’s report "Türkiye and Sudan’s Trade Volume Target for the 5-Year Period is 2 Billion Dollars," Turkish companies had undertaken 90 projects in Sudan by 2021, and the establishment of a Ziraat Participations Bank branch in Khartoum further underscored Türkiye's commitment to deepening economic ties.[6]

14.          On the other hand, Türkiye attaches great importance to the agricultural sector in Sudan. On April 28, 2014, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Sudanese Ministry of Economy and Finance signed an Agricultural Cooperation Agreement under which Türkiye leased 780 thousand hectares of agricultural land for 99 years. Following the entry into force of the agreement, the Turkish-Sudanese International Agriculture and Livestock Joint Stock Company was established under the umbrella of the General Directorate of Agricultural Enterprises (TIGEM) and started operations on 12,500 hectares of the allocated land. Although later winded up, the company constituted and important milestone in Türkiye`s development based investment strategy in Sudan.

15.          Türkiye has also invested in Sudan’s healthcare sector through the inauguration of the above-mentioned joint operation model, by the establishment of an 150-bed Turkish Training and Research Hospital, which began serving the people of Sudan onwards February 28, 2014.

16.          Trade between Türkiye and Sudan remains favorable for Türkiye, although exports experiencing some fluctuation in recent years. According to the Sudan Country Profile published by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, Türkiye maintains a trade surplus in its economic relations with Sudan. As indicated in the Sudan Country Profile, Türkiye’s exports, which increased to $462.9 million in 2022, declined by 19.5% in 2023, amounting to $372.4 million. Similarly, Türkiye’s imports from Sudan, which reached a record high of $233.0 million in 2022, fell by 37.9% in 2023, decreasing to $144.7 million.[7]

17.          These developments reflect Türkiye’s strategic and sustained efforts to foster economic and diplomatic ties across Africa. As trade and investment grow, so does the need for a robust, efficient, and reliable judicial mechanism to protect these relationships.

2      INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR TURKISH INVESTMENTS IN SUDAN AND MALI

2.1        A brief summary of BITs awaiting ratification  

18.          As outlined below, Türkiye has signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with Sudan and Mali. However, these agreements are not yet in force as they await ratification by their respective parliaments. Although no official explanation have been provided for the delay nor a timeline for ratification, it is safe to assume that the African states intend to prioritize BITs aligned with the Investment Protocol under the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement ("African Investment Protocol"). Reflecting this alignment, the BITs with both countries incorporate numerous modern provisions from the African Protocol, such as the "substantial activity" requirement. However, provisions such as the potential for counterclaims by the host state are absent in the Mali and Sudan FTAs.[8]

19.          Given the likely scenario that these agreements may come into force in the long-haul and that they would potentially prevail over the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Agreements, due to their more investor friendly nature, discussed in Section 2.2, this section provides a brief overview of these agreements.

2.1.1        Sudan

20.          The Governments of Türkiye and Sudan have concluded two BITs, one on December 19, 1999, and another on April 30, 2014, though neither has been ratified and entered into force.

21.          The 1999 BIT provides a broad arsenal of protections for Turkish and Sudanese investors within the host state. Article 2, for instance, includes a national treatment clause, ensuring that investors from either state receive treatment equivalent to that of domestic investors, as well as a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause, which guarantees treatment no less favorable than that accorded to other foreign investors.

22.          Additionally, Article 3 of the 1999 BIT addresses the regime for expropriation. According to this provision, expropriation is permissible only if it serves the public interest, is non-discriminatory, and adheres to domestic law. In cases of expropriation or equivalent measures, the investor is entitled to receive effective and adequate compensation.

23.          In the event of an investment-related dispute between the investor and the host state, the 1999 BIT allows the investor to choose between arbitration or the courts of the host state. Article 10 grants the investor the option to bring the case before (i) the competent court of the contracting party, (ii) an arbitral tribunal under ICSID rules, or (iii) an ad hoc tribunal under UNCITRAL rules if the dispute remains unresolved for six months after notification to the host state.

24.          The 2014 BIT builds on the protections established in the 1999 BIT by including obligations for the host state to provide fair and equitable treatment ("FET") and full protection and security ("FPS") to the investment. It is common for both "national treatment" and "most-favored nation" clauses to be included in BITs, as exemplified in the Türkiye–United Kingdom BIT, which contains similar protections.

25.          The dispute resolution clause in the 2014 BIT remains consistent with that in the 1999 BIT.

26.          A comparative analysis of the two BITs reveals that the most significant modification pertains to the definition of an investor. Whereas the 1999 BITs only required registration in one of the contracting states, the 2014 BIT mandates that investor companies engage in "substantial activity" within the contracting states. Furthermore, the 2014 BIT stipulates that an investment must constitute at least 10% of the company’s share capital -if acquired through stock markets- to qualify as an investment. These revisions reflect a mutual intent by the contracting parties to narrow the scope of protected investments, while also providing a higher standard of protection for qualifying investments.

2.1.2        Mali

27.          On March 2, 2018, the Governments of the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Mali concluded the first Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments ("Mali BIT"). The Mali BIT, like the BITs with Sudan, has never been ratified and entered into force.

28.          Like the Sudan BITs, the Mali BIT obligates the contracting parties to provide investors from the other party’s nationality with fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) and full protection and security (“FPS”), along with MFN and national treatment clauses to enhance investor protections.

29.          Consistent with the Sudan BIT, Article 6 of the Mali BIT stipulates that expropriation of foreign investments is permissible only if it serves the public interest, is non-discriminatory, and conforms to domestic law. Investors are entitled to effective and adequate compensation in the event of expropriation or equivalent measures.

30.          Article 10 lists ICC arbitration as an additional dispute resolution option, alongside domestic courts, ICSID arbitration, and UNCITRAL arbitration, consistent with the provisions in the Sudan FTA.

2.2        OIC Investment Treaty

31.          The Organization of Islamic Cooperation Investment Treaty ("OIC IT"), which came into force in February 1998, is currently applicable in 43 countries. The OIC IT aspires to establish an arbitration institution akin to ICSID, aiming to develop a distinct investment protection framework, both procedurally and substantively, for covered investments.

32.          The following sections will elaborate on both the anticipated arbitration institution and the provisional arbitration clause, along with the substantial protections OIC IT affords to investments.

2.2.1        Arbitration clause and conditions for validity

33.          Although Article 17 of the OIC IT does not detail the process or conditions for establishing the dispute resolution body, it specifies that investor-state disputes arising from the implementation of the OIC IT are to be settled by a yet-to-be-established body within the OIC system. As an interim solution, paragraph 2 of Article 17 includes an ad hoc arbitration clause, which remains the only available arbitration mechanism pending the establishment of a permanent body.

34.          To advance the establishment of a dispute resolution body, the OIC and the government of Republic of Türkiye has initiated steps to create the OIC Arbitration Center in Istanbul, reports various sources from the international arbitration community. This center is intended to facilitate investment dispute resolution within the OIC IT framework. Article 4 of the OIC Arbitration Center Statute, published in the Official Gazette of the Government of Republic of Türkiye on January 24, 2020, lists "facilitating the settlement of investment disputes... referred to the center" among its objectives. However, since no decision has yet been made by the OIC’s governing bodies to designate the Istanbul center as the body envisioned in Article 17, the ad hoc arbitration clause remains the default option.

2.2.1.1       Disputes in scope

35.          Investment protection agreements primarily aim to safeguard investors’ fundamental rights and interests within host states. These agreements typically incorporate standards designed to minimize uncertainties and mitigate political or non-commercial risks stemming from differences in legal systems. Consequently, understanding the scope of protected disputes and protections investors are equipped with, are essential for clarifying the fundamental rights and interests in question.

36.          Article 1, paragraph 6, of the OIC IT defines an "Investor" as " The Government of any contracting party or natural corporate person, who is a national of a contracting party and who owns the capital and invests it in the territory of another contracting party." For legal entities, it suffices to be established under the laws of a contracting state to qualify as an investor under the OIC IT with no additional requirements. Thus, investors whose subsidiaries are located in contracting states that are parties to the OIC IT may also qualify as Investors under this Agreement.[9]

37.          "Investment" is defined in Article 1, paragraph 5, as "the use of capital in one of the permitted fields within the territory of a contracting party for the purpose of making a profit in accordance with this Agreement, or the transfer of capital to a contracting party for the same purpose." This definition includes both direct and indirect investments, as confirmed in the Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia ("Al-Warraq Case"), brought under the OIC IT.[10]

38.          In the Al-Warraq case, it was concluded that the term 'disputes arising out of the Agreement' in Article 17 of the OIC ITA encompasses both investor-state and state-state disputes.[11]

39.          In summary, under the OIC IT, both nationals and legal entities from contracting states qualify as investors, and both direct and indirect investments are recognized as investments. Investors may invoke the dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in Article 17 for matters concerning the implementation of the OIC IT.

40.          As discussed further in this Article, Articles 16 and 17 of the OIC IT grant investors the option to seek recourse through (i) the host state’s judicial system, (ii) mediation or (iii) arbitration in the event of a dispute. It should also be noted that the "fork in the road" principle, commonly adopted in investment treaties, is present in Article 16 of the OIC IT. Consequently, once an investor elects a remedy from among those provided, they forfeit the right to pursue alternative remedies.

2.2.1.2       Competent arbitration institutions and arbitrator appointments

41.          Türkiye's Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) generally provide investors with multiple arbitration options. For instance, under the Türkiye-Turkmenistan BIT, an investor alleging a treaty breach may pursue arbitration through the ICC or ICSID or opt for ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL rules. However, as previously mentioned, the OIC framework lacks an established arbitration institution, limiting recourse options.

42.          In arbitration, it is preferable for the parties to appoint the arbitrators themselves. If they cannot agree on appointments—whether for a sole arbitrator or the chairperson of a three-member tribunal—two main alternatives typically arise. First, the courts of the seat of arbitration can assist, but this is not possible here, as the OIC IT does not specify a seat. Second, arbitration institutions may make appointments, but the OIC framework has yet to establish such an institution.

43.          Article 16 of the OIC IT stipulates that if a respondent state fails to appoint an arbitrator, the OIC Secretary-General is authorised to make the appointment—analogous to the role of courts in institutions like the ICC and ISTAC.

44.          In practice, however, the OIC Secretary-General has abstained from fulfilling this role, leading claimants to pursue alternative solutions. One approach has been to request the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague to appoint an arbitrator, invoking the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of the OIC Agreement. Although the PCA proceeded with such appointments, the Paris courts subsequently annulled them, ruling that this practice was incompatible with the terms of the OIC Investment Agreement.[12]

45.                          While this decision implies that arbitration proceedings under the OIC IT cannot proceed if the respondent state fails to appoint an arbitrator. Nevertheless, recourse may be available through French and Swiss courts. Articles 1505 and 1506 of the French Code of Civil Procedure empower the Paris Civil Court to appoint an arbitrator to safeguard a party’s access to justice, even where France is not the arbitration seat[13]. Similarly, Article 179(2) of the Swiss Private International Law Act permits Swiss courts to appoint arbitrators if no seat has been designated and the matter remains unaddressed in other jurisdictions. Thus, a respondent state may be prevented from obstructing the arbitration process through inaction on arbitrator appointments under the OIC framework.

2.2.1.3       Amicable settlement efforts and mediation

46.          Article 17 of the OIC IT, which governs dispute resolution, outlines two methods: conciliation[14] and arbitration[15]. The article’s first paragraph states, "Until an Organ for the settlement of disputes arising under the Agreement is established, disputes that may arise shall be entitled through conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the following rules and procedures:" Therefore, investors may use these mechanisms until a dedicated dispute resolution body is established. In the interim, ad hoc mediation and arbitration are available options for investors.

47.          A key question is whether mediation is a prerequisite for investors to apply for arbitration—that is, whether mediation is mandatory or optional.

48.          Article 17(2)(a), titled Arbitration, states: " If the two parties to the dispute do not reach an agreement as a result of their resort to conciliation, or if the conciliator is unable to issue his report within the prescribed period, or if the two parties do not accept the solutions proposed therein, then each party has the right to resort to the Arbitration Tribunal for a final decision on the dispute.”

49.          This provision -when read in an isolated setting- suggests that mediation may be a prerequisite. However, to fully assess this, it is necessary to interpret this article in line with the other provisions of the OIC IT from an holistic perspective.

50.          In the Al-Warraq case, the arbitral tribunal, considering the parties' claims, assessed its jurisdiction and the need for a separate arbitration agreement. The tribunal concluded that the parties need not exhaust domestic remedies or enter a separate arbitration clause to initiate arbitration, and that the mediation process is not a mandatory prerequisite[16]. Some legal scholars supported this interpretation[17].

51.          Article 17, titled Conciliation, sets forth the conciliation procedure. If the parties agree to conciliation, they must define the dispute, their claims, and select a conciliator. The Secretary-General may be requested to appoint the conciliator.

52.          The article further stipulates that " The task of the conciliator shall be confined to bringing the different viewpoints closer and making proposals which may lead to a solution that may be acceptable to the parties concerned. The conciliator shall, within the period assigned for the completion of his task, submit a report thereon to be communicated to the parties concerned. This report shall have no legal authority before a court should the dispute be referred to it. " The conciliator must act with objectivity and impartiality, as required by the principles inherent to conciliation.

2.2.2        Protections provided

2.2.2.1       Most favored nation requirement (Article 8)

53.          Like national treatment clauses, most-favored nation (MFN) clauses are commonly found in contemporary investment promotion and protection treaties. The goal of MFN provisions is to prevent the host state from giving an investor less favorable treatment than that granted to investors from any third country. In essence, MFN clauses seek to prevent discrimination among foreign investors.

54.          This principle can be applied in two ways. First, the host state should not treat an investor from another similarly situated country more favorably than it treats an investor from an OIC country. For example, an OIC investor should not be charged higher license fees than an investor from Country A for the same license.

55.          The second application is when an investment treaty with another country makes commitments to investors in that country that are not made to investors in OIC countries. Article 8 of the OIC IT specifically sets out the circumstances in which the most-favored nation clause is not applicable. Accordingly,

"2. Provisions of paragraph 1 above shall not be applied to any better treatment given by a contracting party in the following cases:

a) Rights and privileges given to investors of one contracting party by another contracting party in accordance with an international agreement, law or special preferential arrangement.

b) Rights and privileges arising from an international agreement currently in force or to be concluded in the future and to which any contracting party may become a member and under which an economic union, customs union or mutual tax exemption arrangement is set up.

c) Rights and privileges given by a contracting party for a specific project due to its special importance to that state. "

56.          Article 8(2)(a) could compel the incorporation of additional rights from other treaties into an OIC case. For example, in the Al Warraq case, the claimant invoked the MFN clause in the OIC IT to import the fair and equitable treatment clause from the UK-Indonesia BIT. While the respondent argued that the OIC IT and the UK-Indonesia BIT address different issues, the arbitral tribunal ruled that both treaties aim to promote and protect investments, allowing the importation of the fair and equitable treatment clause.[18]

2.2.2.2       Prohibition of expropriation (Article 10)

57.          Most of the BITs require host states to compensate foreign investors if their assets are expropriated, be it directly or indirectly.[19] The principle remains concrete under the OIC IT.

58.          In international investment law, direct expropriation—referred to as nationalization in Article 47 of the Turkish Constitution—occurs when the host state confiscates an investor’s assets following its own laws. In investment arbitration, the question is not whether expropriation has occurred, but whether it happened in violation of the relevant investment treaty.

59.          Indirect expropriation can occur when state actions—such as regulatory or supervisory measures—significantly diminish the value of a foreign investment. Arbitral tribunals assess indirect expropriation on a case-by-case basis, as many investment treaties do not define it.

60.          Whether an action constitutes indirect expropriation under the OIC IT can be assessed in the light of the following criteria, which have already been evaluated amongst the scholars and case law (i) the degree of interference of the measure with the right to property (ii) the duration of the challenged regulatory action (iii) the economic impact of the challenged action (iv) the nature of the challenged action and whether it is within the scope of the state's right to exercise its sovereignty (police powers) (v) proportionality and (vi) foreseeability of the measure.[20]  Although in many cases these criteria are assessed independently of the relevant investment treaty, different tribunals may make different decisions on the interpretation of these criteria.[21]

2.2.2.3       Prohibition of interference in the use and management of the investment (Article 10)

61.          Article 10 of the OIC IT requires the host state to avoid actions that would hinder the effective management and utilization of an investment. This "non-impairment obligation[22] closely related to the fair and equitable treatment standard, prohibits unjust interference in the management, operation, or realization of the investment. Article 10 also specifies that actions by competent authorities or enforcement of court decisions are exempt from this obligation, leaving it to the arbitral tribunal to determine if an action qualifies as such an exemption. The host state must substantiate the preventive nature of the action in question before the tribunal.

2.2.2.4       Freedom to transfer funds (Article 11)

62.          The right to transfer funds is a core issue where investor and host state interests often diverge. Investors typically seek to repatriate profits, while the host state aims to protect its currency and foreign reserves. Thus, monitoring and controlling significant fund transfers are essential.[23]

63.          Article 11 of the OIC IT guarantees investors the unrestricted transfer of capital and profits in cash to any contracting party without discriminatory banking, administrative, or legal barriers, as well as without any transfer taxes.

3      CONCLUSION

64.          Türkiye’s direct investments in African countries have accelerated aligned with its strategic diversification and economic growth goals. African nations, particularly Mali and Sudan, have become attractive to Turkish investors for their resources, emerging domestic markets, and strategic potential. These investments create jobs and foster economic development, aligning with Türkiye's diplomatic and commercial objectives. However, political instability in Africa poses considerable risks to foreign investments, increasing the need for BITs that offer arbitration mechanisms to protect Turkish investors.

65.          The protections in these agreements are critical, especially given recent political upheavals in Africa. They ensure a safer environment for sustainable growth and cooperation. While the lack of an established OIC arbitration institution and the idleness of the OIC Secretary-General on arbitrator appointments present challenges, certain international courts can provide solutions. Given the complexity of these processes, engaging specialized legal counsel is essential for effective protection and dispute resolution.

SOURCE

-        Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, All-Warraq Award on Respondent's Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the Claims, UNCITRAL, 21.06.2012.

-        Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. The Republic of Indonesia, Final Award, UNCITRAL, 15.12.2014.

-        Caline MOUAWAD & Lillian KHOURY, "Investment Arbitration under Multilateral Treaties in the Middle East”.

-        DEIK, BAIN & Company, 2019, Foreign Investment Index, Istanbul: DEIK, BAIN & Company.

-        DEIK, FDI Center, 2019, Foreign Expansion Guide, Istanbul: DEIK, FDI Center.

-        DEİK, 2021, African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and Its Impact on All Firms, Istanbul: DEIK.

-        DEIK, BAIN & Company, 2021, Foreign Investment Index, Istanbul: DEIK, BAIN & Company.

-        DEIK, 2017, Sub-Saharan Africa Energy Investment Climate Assessment, Istanbul: DEIK.

-        DEİK, 2022, Financial Information Note, Istanbul: DEİK.

-        DEİK, Sudan Information Note, Istanbul: DEİK.

-        DLA Piper, 2021, Paris Court of Appeal finds PCA lacked power to intervene in OIC investor-state arbitration.

-        Hossein ABEDIAN & Reza EFTEKHAR, "Consent to Investor-State Arbitration in the Second Largest International Investment Protection Agreement: The Correct Interpretive Approach to Article 17 of the OIC Investment Agreement".

-        Katia Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Has the line been drawn? in Arbitration under International Investment Agreements: A guide to Key Issues (2^nd Edition)

-        Lowenfeld, 2008, International Economic Law (2^nd Edition)

-        OECD, 2008 OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (4^th Edition) https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264045743-en.pdf

-        Oruç, Ali, 2022, "Evaluation of Türkiye's Africa Strategy in the Context of Foreign Economic Relations and Suggestions". Ankara: Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, Presidency of Strategy and Budget Directorate.

-        Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, 2023, Foreign Investment Report.

-        Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, 2024, Foreign Investment Report.

-        Wallace, Sabahi "Some Preliminary Thoughts On The Afcfta Draft Investment Protocol: Innovations And Challenges In International Investment Law", The Serbian Yearbook of International Law (SYIL) (2023).

-        French approach to the OIC Treaty gives cause to crow | Derains & Gharavi International (derainsgharavi.com)

-        Paris Court of Appeal finds PCA lacked power to intervene in OIC investor-state arbitration | DLA Piper

-        Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economocial Analysis

-        Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, UNCITRAL, 17 March 2006

-        Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008)